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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Respondent,

PETITION FOR REHEARING

:

v.

:

KAREN MARIE JOHNSON,

:

Ca|se No. 870222-CA

:

Priority No. 2

Appellant/Petitioner.

STATEMENT OF THE CAjSE
This is a petition for rehearing of a decision filed by
this Court on March 21, 1989. Originally, this case was an appeal
from judgment and conviction for Possession of a Controlled
Substance, a class A misdemeanor, in the Third Judicial District
Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The facts are set forth in Appellant's opening brief at
1-4.

INTRODUCTION
This petition for rehearing is filed pursuant to Rule 35,
Utah Rules of the Court of Appeals.

In Brown v. Pickard, denying

reh'g, 11 P. 512 (Utah 1886), the Utah Supreme Court established the
standard for granting a petition for rehearing, stating:
To justify a rehearing, a strong case must be
made. We must be convinced that the court failed
to consider some material point iln the case, or
that it erred in its conclusions . . . .

11 P. at 512. Later, in Cummings v. Nielson, 129 P. 619 (1913),
this Court added:
To make an application for a rehearing is a matter
of right, and we have no desire to discourage the
practice of filing petitions for rehearings in
proper cases. When this court, however, has
considered and decided all of the material
questions involved in a case, a rehearing should
not be applied for, unless we have misconstrued or
overlooked some statute or decision which may
affect the result, or that we have based the
decision on some wrong principle of law, or have
either misapplied or overlooked something which
materially affects the result . . . If there are
some reasons, however, such as we have indicated
above, or other good reasons, a petition for a
rehearing should be promptly filed and, if it is
meritorious, its form will in no case be
scrutinized by this court.
Cummings, 129 P. at 624. The argument section of this brief will
establish that, applying these standards, this petition for
rehearing is properly before the Court and should be granted.

In

its opinion in State v. Johnson, 104 Utah Adv. Rep. 34 (filed
March 21, 1989) (attached as Addendum A ) , this Court misconstrued
and misapplied the facts and law applicable to this case.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Given the fact that the Utah search and seizure
protection has not yet been developed in case law, along with the
fact that Utah Code Ann. §77-7-15 (1980) is merely a codification of
the constitutional protections against search and seizure, the Utah
constitutional and statutory issues were adequately preserved for
review in this case.
The officer lacked a reasonable articulable suspicion to

detain the defendant, a passenger in a vehi|cle which was stopped for
an equipment violation.

The fact that a pe rson is a passenger in a

vehicle where the registered owner is not ajlso present is not
sufficient to establish a reasonable articu lable suspicion that the
vehicle is stolen and that the passenger is culpable.

ARGUMENT
POINT I. THE UTAH CONSTITUIONAb AND S T A T U T U R Y
ISSUES WERE ADEQUATELY PRESERVED AT TRIAL.
In its decision, this Court stated that "defendant failed
to brief or argue these issues at the trial level and first raised
her statutory argument in her appellate brief."

State v. Johnson,

104 Utah Adv. Rep. at 34. On the contrary, in her Memorandum in
Support of Motion to Suppress, defense counsel specifically
mentioned Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution.
Furthermore, in argument at the hearing on the Motion to Suppress,
she stated:

" . . . I think it violates the Utah Constitution as

well, although that has not been developed in the case law very
well . . . " (T. 40). Furthermore, the statutory provision is merely
a codification of the constitutional protections and is adequately
covered simply by arguing that the seizure was unreasonable.
By requiring trial counsel to do more than name the
applicable provision of the Utah Constitution and acknowledge that
at the time of the hearing the Utah constitq tional argument had not
been developed in case law leaves appellate and trial counsel in a
"never-never land" where it is unclear exactl ly how much must be done

at the trial level to preserve an issue for appeal.

Specifically

mentioning by article and section a provision of the Utah
Constitution which is violated should be sufficient to preserve that
issue for appeal.

POINT II. THIS COURT MISCONSTRUED THE FACTS AND
MISAPPREHENDED THE LAW WHEN IT DETERMINED THAT THE
OFFICER HAD A REASONABLE ARTICULABLE SUSPICION
WHICH JUSTIFIED THE DETENTION OF MS. JOHNSON.
The impact of this Court's decision is to allow officers
to seize all occupants in a car where the registered owner is not
present, without requiring a showing that the car might be stolen or
that, if it is stolen, the passenger is involved in any way.
Pursuant to this decision, a nanny driving the family car and all of
the occupants will be subject to seizure as will the husband and his
friends where the wife is the registered owner and has a different
surname from her husband.
In this case, the officer testified that because the
registered owner was not present, he thought there was a
"possibility" the car was stolen.

A "possibility" is not equivalent

to a constitutionally required reasonable, articulable suspicion.
Furthermore, a "possibility" that a car is stolen does not
automatically implicate the passenger in any illegal activity.
State v. Banks, 720 P.2d 1380, 1382-3 (Utah 1986).

See

"[A] person's

mere presence in the company of others whom the police have probable
cause to search does not provide probable cause to search that
person."

J^d. citing United States v. Pi Re, 332 U.S. 581, 587, 68

S.Ct. 222, 225, 92 L.Ed.2d 210 (1948)
In addition, even if the meager facts known to the
officer at the time he detained Ms. Johnson did in some way amount
to a reasonable articulable suspicion that the vehicle was stolen
and that Ms. Johnson was somehow implicated, the officer exceeded
the scope of any permissible seizure when he detained Ms. Johnson to
run a warrants check on her.

The permissible scope of any detention

would be limited to investigation necessary to ascertain whether the
vehicle was in fact stolen.

This might include asking the driver

(or the passenger) the name of the owner and how the driver came to
be in possession of the vehicle along with running a stolen vehicle
check.

However, it would not include runnilng a warrants check on

the passenger, especially where further inquiry regarding the
driver's possession of the vehicle has not been made.

Hence, even

if a seizure of Ms. Johnson were permissibl|e, the officer exceeded
the proper scope, thereby violating the fou rth amendment.
Because the only information knoWn to the officer at the
time he detained Ms. Johnson was that the r bgistered owner was not
present, the officer lacked a reasonable ar ticulable suspicion so as
to justify the detention of a passenger in the vehicle. The
detention in this case violated the fourth Amendment to the United
States Constitution and all evidence which plowed from the illegal
detention must be suppressed.

- 5

.

CONCLUSION
Because this Court misconstrued and misapplied the facts
and the law in this case, Ms. Johnson respectfully petitions this
Court to reconsider its decision in this case and reverse the
conviction and remand the case for dismissal or a new trial absent
the illegally seized evidence.
Respectfully submitted this ^/

f April, 1989.

Attorney for Defendaiit/Appe
.I
C. gJOx

rOAN C. WATT
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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IN THE
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
The STATE of Utah,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
Karen Marie JOHNSON,
Defendant and Appellant.
No. 870222-CA
FILED: March 21,1989
Third District, Salt Lake County
Honorable Raymond S. Uno
ATTORNEYS:
Debra K. Loy, Joan C. Watt, Salt Lake City,
for Appellants
Dan R. Larsen, R. Paul Van Dam, Salt Lake
City, for Respondents
Before Judges Davidson, Garff and Orme.
OPINION
GARFF, Judge:
Defendant, Karen Marie Johnson, appeals
the trial court's denial of her motion to suppress and her conviction for possession of a
controlled substance.1 We affirm.
On November 3, 1986, Deputy Sheriff
Stroud stopped a vehicle for having a faulty
brake light. Defendant was a passenger in that
vehicle. At the suppression hearing, Stroud
testified that prior to stopping the vehicle, he
ran a check on the license plate and obtained
the name of the registered owner. He then
approached the stopped vehicle and asked the
driver for her license. The name on the license
was not the name of the registered owner.
When Stroud requested the registration certificate, the driver was unable to produce it.
Stroud then asked defendant for identification, reasoning that there was a possibility the
car was stolen because there was no registration and no owner present. After initially
denying that she had any identification, defendant told Stroud her name and birthdate.
Stating that he would be right back and
expecting the driver and defendant to remain,
Stroud returned to his vehicle and ran license
checks on the two, determining that the driver
was driving on a suspended license and that
defendant had several outstanding warrants.
He did not, however, inquire as to whether the
car was stolen, nor did he know of any reports
of stolen cars matching that car's description.
He then wrote a citation on the driver and
requested a backup police officer.
When defendant was informed that she was
being arrested for outstanding warrants, she
exited the vehicle, holding a backpack which

tnson

CODE* co

lev. 34

Provo. Utah

hid the name "Karen" on it. Defendant initially denied that the backpack belonged to her,
bult later admitted that it was hers. Incident to
her arrest, the bag was searched and was
found to contain amphetamines, drug paraphernalia and defendant's Utah identification.
Defendant's version of the sequence of
events varies from Stroud's. She testified that
after Stroud received the driver's license, he
asked defendant if she had any identification.
Shi said that she did not. He told them to
wait, that he would be right back, and returned to his vehicle for five or ten minutes,
long enough for her to smoke a cigarette or
twq. When he returned, he asked for the regI istration certificate. When it could not be
produced, Stroud asked defendant to return to
his vehicle with him, where, at his request, she
gavi him her name and birthdate. He then
sentj her back to the other car. Fifteen minutes
later, he came back to their car, gave the
driver a citation, took defendant out of the
car, frisked and handcuffed her, and put her
in tl^e front seat of the sheriffs car. She had
possession of her bag at this time. Defendant
stated that she gave Stroud her name and
birthdate because she was required to do so,
and ({lid not believe that she could leave.
T^e issues on appeal are: (1) whether defendant may raise, for the first time on appeal,
the argument that state law and article 1
section 14 of the Utah Constitution provide
greater protection than the fourth amendment
of t^e United States Constitution against
unreasonable search and seizure; (2) whether
defendant, a passenger in a motor vehicle, was
seized within the meaning of the fourth amendment; and (3) if there was a seizure,
whether it was reasonable.
In considering the trial court's action in
denying defendant's motion to suppress, we
will n^t disturb its factual evaluation unless its
findings are clearly erroneous. State v.
Walkdr, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987). The
trial judge is in the best position to assess the
credibility and accuracy of the witnesses'
divergent testimonies. State v. Arroyo, 102
Utah Adv. Rep. 34, 35 (Ct. App. Feb. 15,
1989); State v. Sierra, 754 P.2d 972, 974 (Utah
Ct. App. 1988). However, in assessing the trial
court's! legal conclusions based upon its
factual! findings, we afford it no deference but
apply a "correction of error" standard. Oates
v. Chavez, 749 P.2d 658,659 (Utah 1988).
UVAH CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUE
Defendant claims that her detention violated
the foiirth amendment of the United States
Constitution and article 1 section 14 of the
Utah Constitution. She also argues that the
legislative intent behind Utah Code Ann. §777-15 (1980) was to provide greater protection
against unreasonable searches and seizures
than is provided by the fourth amendment,
and that her seizure violated the provisions of

CODE*co
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both constitutions. However, defendant failed
to brief or argue these issues at the trial level
and first raised her statutory argument in her
appellate brief. Nominally alluding to such
different constitutional guarantees without any
analysis before the trial court does not sufficiently raise the issue to permit consideration
by this court on appeal. James v. Preston, 746
P.2d 799, 801 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). "[W]here
a defendant fails to assert a particular ground
for suppressing unlawfully obtained evidence
in the trial court, an appellate court will not
consider that ground on appeal .... [M]otions
to suppress should be supported by precise
averments, not conclusory allegations ...." Stare
v. Carter, 707 P.2d 656, 660-61 (Utah
1985). Also, in State v. Lee, 633 P.2d 48, 53
(Utah 1981), the supreme court stated:
There is nothing in the record to
indicate that the point now urged
upon this Court was unavailable or
unknown to defendant at the time
he filed his motion to suppress, and
to entertain the point now would be
to sanction the practice of withholding positions that should properly
be presented to the trial court but
which may be withheld for the
purpose of seeking a reversal on
appeal and a new trial or dismissal.
We, therefore, decline to consider this argument on appeal.
SEIZURE
Defendant avers that she was seized within
the meaning of the fourth amendment because
she felt that she was not free to leave when
Stroud told her to wait while he returned to
his vehicle to check on the driver's license and
to run a warrants check on defendant. "A
seizure within the meaning of the fourth
amendment occurs only when the officer by
means of physical force or show of authority
has in some way restricted the liberty of a
person." State v. Trujillo, 739 P.2d 85, 87
(Utah Ct. App. 1987). further, "[w]hen a
reasonable person, based on the totality of the
circumstances, remains, not in the spirit of
cooperation ... but because he believes he is
not free to leave," a seizure occurs. Id.; see
also United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S.
544, 554, 100 S. Ct. 1870, 1877 (1980). Defendant was, therefore, seized when Stroud took
her name and birthdate and expected her to
wait while he ran a warrants check. Under the
totality of the circumstances, defendant was
reasonably justified in her belief that she was
not free to go.
Now, the concern is whether the seizure was
reasonable and permissible under the fourth
amendment. In State v. Deitman, 739 P.2d
616 (Utah 1987) (per curiam), the Utah
Supreme Court adopted the reasoning in United
States v. Merritt,
736 F.2d 223, 230

v. Rep. 34
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(5th Cir. 1984), wherein the Fifth Circuit
specified three constitutionally permissible
levels of police stops:
(1) an officer may approach a
citizen at anytime [sic] and pose
questions so long as the citizen is
not detained against his will; (2) an
officer may seize a person if the
officer has an "articulable suspicion" that the person has committed
or is about to commit a crime;
however, the "detention must be
temporary and last no longer than
is necessary to effectuate the
purpose of the stop"; (3) an officer
may arrest a suspect if the officer
has probable cause to believe an
offense has been committed or is
being committed.
Deitman, 739 P.2d at 617-18.
We conclude that the present case involves a
"level two" stop. Thus, to justify the seizure,
Stroud had to have a reasonable "articulable
suspicion" that defendant had committed a
crime. To determine if he acted reasonably
under the circumstances, "due weight must be
given, not to his inchoate and unparticuiarized
suspicion or 'hunch,* but to the specific reasonable inferences which he is entitled to draw
from the facts in light of his experience." Terry
v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27, 88 S. Ct. 1868,
1883(1968).
At this point, we defer to the findings of the
trial judge because of his preferred position in
evaluating the witnesses' credibility. See
Arroyo, 102 Utah Adv. Rep. at 35. The record
indicates that the trial court believed Stroud's
testimony in concluding there was an articulable suspicion that defendant had committed a
crime. Prior to asking defendant for identification, Stroud believed that there was a possibility the car was stolen because the owner
was absent and there was no registration. He
knew that the driver was not the owner, but
determined that it was reasonable to ask defendant her name to determine if it corresponded with the owner's name he had learned
prior to stopping the vehicle. The fact that
Stroud initially chose to do a warrants check
instead of a stolen vehicle check is of no great
significance because not all stolen cars are
reported immediately. The trial judge stated
that where there is a legitimate traffic stop,
the driver has a suspended license, and there is
"no way of telling who the owner of the
vehicle is and whether they have permission to
drive it because the owner is not present," a
reasonable officer would inquire regarding the
identity of a passenger. In weighing the testimony, the court was justified in finding that
the amount of time defendant was required to
wait, even though a passenger, was reasonable
and did not take any longer than a normal
traffic stop.
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Thus, there was substantial evidence for the
trial court to find as it did. Although a seizure
occurred, it conformed to constitutional requirements in that Officer Stroud had a reasonable articulable suspicion that the car could
have been stolen, and defendant was not detained for an unreasonable period of time. We,
therefore, affirm defendant's conviction.
Regnal W. Garff, Judge
I CONCUR:
Richard C. Davidson, Judge
1. At a bench trial, defendant was convicted on
stipulated facts testified to at a previous hearing on
defendant's motion to suppress.
2. Utah has never drawn any distinctions between
these two provisions and has "always considered the
protections afforded to be one and the same." State
v. Watts, 750 P.2d 1219, 1221 (Utah 1988).
However, in a footnote comment, the court indicated that it has not ruled out the possibility of
making such a distinction in a future case. Id. at n.
8.
ORME, Judge (dissenting):
Although the legal analysis applicable to this
case is ably set out in the majority's opinion,
I cannot agree with their ultimate conclusion
that the arresting officer had an articulable
suspicion that the automobile had been stolen,
much less that defendant had in any way
participated in the theft.
The only facts relied on by the officer were
that the driver's name was not the name of
the registered owner and the driver was not
able to locate the registration certificate. These
facts are just as consistent with the more likely
scenario that the driver borrowed the car from
its rightful owner. Absent more-and this is
all the officer pointed to-there was simply
no articulable suspicion, as a matter of law,
that the car had been stolen.
I would accordingly reverse.
Gregory K. Orme, Judge
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IN THE
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
WICAT SYSTEMS, and Hartford Insurance
Group,
Petitioners,
v.
Sylvia PELLEGRINI, Second Injury Fund of
Utah, and Industrial Commission of Utah,
Respondents.
No. 8S0218-CA
FILED: March 22,1989
Industrial Commission
ATTORNEYS:
Stuart LH Poelman, Salt Lake City, for
Petitioners.
Eric V. doorman, Second Injury Fund, Salt
Lake City, for Respondents.
Before Judges Davidson, Billings, and Garff.
OPINION
DAVIDS0N, Judge:
On June 21, 1983, Sylvia Pellegrini, an
employee of Wicat Systems, injured her wrist
while at work. In 1987, Pellegrini filed a claim
with the Industrial Commission for permanent
total disability. The parties stipulated that
Pellegrini had a preexisting impairment of
469ii prior to 1980, that she incurred an additional 12% impairment prior to 1983, that the
injury to her wrist caused another 24V© impairment,1 and that she was now, with the wrist
injury, permanently and totally disabled. The
only issud before the- Administrative Law
Judge was the proper apportionment between
Wicat Systems and the Second Injury Fund.
The A.L.J, determined that Utah Code
Ann. §35^1-69 (as amended 1984) controlled, even though Pellegrini's injury occurred
in 1983, and so computed Wicat's share of the
liability at 24/64ths or 37.5%. Wicat filed a
motion foi( review claiming that the 1981
version of section 35-1-69, which would
have placed its share of liability at 12/64ths
or 18.75%, I should have instead been applied.
The Commission denied Wicat's motion.
The sole issue before us is whether the 1984
amendments to section 35-1-69 were procedural or remedial such that they could be
applied retroactively to an injury that occurred
before the effective date of the amendments.2
We hold th^t the amendments were not remedial, and, therefore, did not apply retroactively.
In workers' compensation cases, we generally apply the law existing at the time of
injury. Moofc v. American Coal Co., 737

